



Shield Associates Premises Review

O2 Victoria Warehouse - Manchester

Prepared for

Phil Crier PBC Licensing and Academy Music
Group (AMG)

Prepared by

Gary Taylor MLoL, NEBOSH, Director SA

Assisted by

Ian Smith MSyl, Director SA

David Gair IPSA, Director SA



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1. Introduction

1.1. I retired from the Metropolitan Police Service as a Superintendent with over 30 years exemplary service, I was the Deputy Borough Commander for the West Area Basic Command Unit (boroughs of Hounslow, Ealing, and Hillingdon). This is a policing area of over 140 square miles. I was the BCU lead for Counter Terrorism with responsibility for RAF Northolt. I was the strategic lead for Licensing within the Metropolitan Police Service, under Operation Equinox where I oversaw significant reductions in crime and disorder across London. I was considered to be a police licensing subject matter expert. I have a wealth of experience within public order and policing large scale events including crowd control and dynamics. In my final posting before retirement, I was Deputy Borough Commander of Roads and Transport Policing (RTPC), with strategic responsibility within the Metropolitan Police District for roads policing which included oversight of large-scale events. I was also the MPS lead for forensic collision investigation. I was level 1 public order trained and a silver firearms commander. I have attained CMI Level 7 Certificate in Strategic Management and Leadership, accreditation to NEBOSH level in health and safety, and I am a current member of the Institute of Licensing.

1.2. Shield Associates is a company formed by former senior Metropolitan police officers in 2013. The three Directors all served a minimum of 30 years and were at different times responsible for policing, liaison, partnership working and compliance in relation to licensed premises in the Boroughs of Westminster, Southwark, Sutton, Kingston-upon-Thames, Uxbridge, and West Area BCU, as well as being involved in the planning and coordination of licensing initiatives and compliance strategies across the Metropolitan Police area.

1.3. Shield Associates Directors all served in senior positions within the Metropolitan Police, Ian Smith – Detective Superintendent and Borough Commander, Gary Taylor – Superintendent; Deputy Borough Commander, Op Equinox Pan-London Licensing Lead, and David Gair – Chief Inspector; Public Order and Licensing specialist. All three Directors were responsible for crime and disorder reduction, community confidence, public satisfaction and licensing related issues and enforcement with specific dedicated licensing teams under their command.

1.4. David Gair was a trained level 1 and level 2 public order commander and attended several large-scale events and public disorder incidents. He has provided advice, strategy, and policy in managing large scale events, and coordinated responses to incidents of public disorder. He is a member of The International Professional Security Association (IPSA), Institute of Conflict Management, and Institute of Licensing.

1.5. Ian Smith retired as a Detective Superintendent after having completed 30 years exemplary police service. He has extensive experience in policing across many challenging London boroughs including Lambeth, Southwark, Croydon and latterly Kingston-Upon-Thames. He was a senior investigating officer for the Homicide Command. During his police service he was responsible for overseeing policing operations including crime prevention strategies and enforcement. He was the Deputy Borough Commander at Southwark where he had responsibility for implementing crime and disorder strategies across the borough, which saw unprecedented reductions in serious violence and anti-social behaviour. In 2011 he was commended for leading the investigation response into the crimes committed following the London wide disorders. He is an accredited senior investigating officer for serious and complex investigations and has extensive experience in managing significant critical incidents. He was also the lead for introducing offender management policies both at a local and national level during his time with the Metropolitan Police Service which included managing serious public disorder. Ian is a member of the Security Institute and Institute of Licensing.

1.6. As part of our police licensing response, we have all at some stage undertaken problem solving, partnership working and compliance regimes to ensure the safety and security of patrons, staff, and the local community in relation to NTE licensed premises, in particular large night-clubs and venues that remained open beyond 02.00 hours. This included late-night refreshment houses, liaison with public transport providers and licensed mini-cab activities as part of the larger problem-solving initiatives.

1.7. Shield Associates also deliver training for owners, DPS, licensees, security companies, bar staff and workers involved with NTE venues around crime reduction, anti-social behaviour, and awareness of their responsibilities under the Licensing Act, forensic awareness, drugs awareness, personal safety and vulnerable persons. Shield Associates Directors are all members of the Institute of Licensing.

1.8. As a company our aim is to provide independent regulatory support to the Licensing trade, offer problem solving and compliance guidance and support the key objectives of the Licensing Act in reviewing working practices, policies, and procedures to ensure:

- The security and safety of those visiting a venue.
- The prevention of crime and disorder
- The prevention of public nuisance
- The protection of young and vulnerable people from harm

1.9. As such we have undertaken comprehensive reviews and audits of licensed premises to ensure compliance and promote responsible management in support of the licensing objectives. We have delivered training to staff at licensed venues, local Pub-Watch schemes, personal licence holders and SIA door security companies.

1.10. As a company, we undertake independent reviews of premises when instructed to do so. In doing so we recognise that our duty is to provide an independent, objective report to the licensing committee, bearing in mind the potential impact of the premises and its hours on the licensing objectives.

1.11. All issues identified in our reports are true to the best of our knowledge and experience. They were either witnessed or experienced by us or told to us in good faith. The opinions expressed in this report are honestly held and correct to the best of our judgement. The fee for this report is not conditional on the outcome of the case in anyway whatsoever.

1.12. I am aware of the potential impact of the operation of NTE venues on local communities and have provided reports to licensing committees and courts in relation to a variety of licensing issues on various occasions both as a police officer and as a Director of Shield Associates.

2. Instructions to Shield Associates

2.1. Phil Crier from PBC Licensing contacted Shield Associates (SA) on 26th October 2023 and requested specialist independent licensing consultancy in relation to the O2 Victoria Warehouse, Manchester.

2.2. Phil Crier explained that the venue had been taken to a licensing review hearing scheduled for the 11th December 2023. This had been instigated by the Trafford local authority Health and Safety officer Nicola Duckworth who had supplied a statement. There were no specific licence breaches disclosed or known to AMG or the O2 Victoria Warehouse. The statement and associated document bundle was supplied to SA for review.

3. Terms of Reference

3.1. SA agreed to the following terms of reference.

- To provide an independent report with recommendations if any, analysing the ingress, egress and dispersal of customers to the venue O2 Victoria Warehouse.
- To review supplied policies, operational procedures, and proposed licence conditions.
- To provide an assessment on the opinion presented in the statement by Nicola Duckworth (H&S) Trafford Local Authority.
- To attend any licensing hearing if required.

4. Methodology

4.1. SA would assess the physical site primarily focussing on the outside of the venue to determine if the procedures outlined are considered effective. This will include all elements of ingress including up to the point of search and entry into the venue.

4.2. SA would look at elements of the internal operation as this had been highlighted by the local authority as a point of concern.

4.3. SA has also agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of all proposed documented policies, procedures, and operational measures SA have relied upon documents supplied, and the various communications with AMG and visits to the venue.

4.4. SA had the opportunity to observe 2 live events on the 10th and 11th November 2023. These were well attended live music events by the artist Jesse Ware at or near venue capacity. The 11th November event coincided with a Manchester United F.C fixture, so SA had the opportunity to comment on the issues identified with a match day clash.

4.5. SA would consider the key observations made in a statement dated 7th September 2023 by Nicola Duckworth (ND) of Trafford Council Health and Safety.

1. Para.2 - In 2019 ND was concerned regarding the speeding vehicles in Trafford Wharf Road with a risk of persons being struck by fast moving vehicles, either intentionally or by accident.
2. Para.3 - Crowd management at the O2 Victoria Warehouse

3. Para.3 - Risks associated with holding events at the same time as other local large events (i.e., Manchester United Football Club)
4. Para.6 Proper systems for Ingress and Egress.
5. Para.6 - CCTV Issues
6. Para.6 - Lighting Issues
7. Para.6 - Medical Provision
8. Para.10 – Concern regarding crime and disorder associated with football fans leaving Manchester United Football Club.
9. Para. 17 – Concern regarding access control to the mezzanine balcony within the venue.
10. Para. 20 – Concern over the stewarding plan being generic.
11. Para. 35 – Opinion that the venue has failed to operate the premises in a manner consistent with promoting the licensing objectives. (ND outlines the rationale for this opinion).

4.6. SA will provide opinion and consider within their observations if the venue management are supporting and upholding the 4 licensing objectives.

- The security and safety of those visiting the venue.
- The prevention of crime and disorder
- The prevention of public nuisance
- The protection of young and vulnerable people from harm

5. History of Venue

5.1. SA have gathered information about the venue as part of its general review. It is a landmark building on the outskirts of the city centre and was originally the Liverpool Warehousing Company. This comprised of two large warehouses built in 1925 and 1936. The Victoria Warehouse is now the only one of the surviving warehouses of its kind, retaining a classic internal structure of cast iron columns and classic Victorian warehouse architecture.

5.2. The early renovation of Victoria Warehouse began in 2009, and subsequently went on to become one of the premier events and hospitality venues in the North of England with multiple rooms, formats and configurations. The saleable capacity for live events in the main auditorium is 3,500, whilst the multi-room format increases the overall capacity to 5,400.

5.3. Academy Music Group (AMG) announced it was welcoming Victoria Warehouse into its group in August 2018, the nineteenth venue in its portfolio and officially rebranded to O2 Victoria Warehouse Manchester on 1st September 2018. Since launch in 2018, the venue has admitted over 600,000 guests. It is estimated that the venue customers contribute to more than £5 million annually into Trafford Borough as well as the Greater Manchester economy each year.

5.4. O2 Victoria Warehouse Manchester has hosted meetings with the Leader and deputy Leader of Trafford Council, Tom Ross and Catherine Hynes, to discuss the integration of O2 Victoria Warehouse Manchester into Trafford's culture and heritage strategy. The leaders were impressed with the recent BBC 6 music festival and how this promoted and raised the profile of Trafford.

5.5. O2 Victoria Warehouse Manchester also supports local initiatives including mentoring schemes at Gorse Hill Studios as well as providing space for Greater Manchester Police to train police dogs at no cost to the police service.

6. Documents supplied to Shield Associates

6.1. The following documents listed below have been supplied to SA. SA have also held discussions with AMG Management at the O2 Victoria Warehouse, along with senior managers of Compact Security Services Ltd, which will form part of this report. As the venue is operational, SA have had the opportunity to attend the venue on 2 events and observe some of these policies in action. SA were able to examine these documents and assess if they were being adhered to in a live environment. SA will refer to those that they feel are most important to their terms of reference.

- O2 Victoria Warehouse (VW) Overview Document
- Statement by Nicola Duckworth (ND), H&S Trafford Council.
- Premises licence review application (submitted by ND, Trafford LA)
- Exhibits Bundle (supplied by ND)
- O2 VW - premises licence
- O2 VW – Building /Mezzanine Plan
- O2 VW – Proposed licence conditions
- O2 VW Event Management Plan (EMP)
- O2 VW Example Event Risk Assessment
- Compact Security Stewarding Plan
- O2 VW Ingress Procedure

- O2 VW Ingress Procedure – Match Day Clash
- O2 VW Showstop meeting agenda
- O2 VW Showstop procedure
- O2 VW Emergency Lockdown procedure
- O2 VW Alcohol Management Plan
- O2 VW Bars and Pop ups floor plan
- AMG Policy – Working in licensed premises.
- O2 VW Egress and Dispersal Procedure
- ETC Traffic Management Plan
- O2 VW Emergency Operations Plan
- O2 VW Fire Management Procedure
- NW EMS Event Medical and Safeguarding Plan - example
- O2 VW Welfare and Safeguarding plan
- W.E.L.SAFE management overview
- O2 VW Approach to Counter Terrorism
- O2 VW Sound Control
- Acoustic Noise Management report
- O2 VW Noise Management Strategy
- O2 VW Drugs Policy
- O2 VW Prohibited items.
- O2 VW Dot Plan – Ingress and Egress
- AMG Neighbourhood Procedure
- AMG Waste Management Plan
- O2 VW Access Procedure
- O2 VW Steward Accessibility Briefing
- O2 VW Control of Balcony access.

7. Visit to O2 Victoria Warehouse Manchester – 10/11/2023 – Approximate attendance 3200

7.1. On Friday 10th November 2023, SA consultants visited the O2 Victoria Warehouse and met with key management team individuals, including venue General Manager Russell Taylor-Toal, Duty Manager (and deputy General Manager) Manos Chatzakis and Lee Hazeldine, Director, Compact Security Ltd. An initial meeting with all members then led to a tour of the venue's exterior, including the adjacent hotel / entertainment space within Victoria Warehouse. The discussions focused on understanding the queuing process, including the identification of 'pick out points' for patrons and the ticket inspection and searching procedures, how customers were protected from vehicular traffic,

barrier configuration, accessibility and egress configuration and management, together with the traffic management plan. SA consultants were then given a comprehensive tour of the interior of the venue, including the balcony floor, medical room, production managers area, control room, and the 'W.E.L.SAFE' area. After the tour, SA had a detailed conversation with the AMG representatives regarding the operational procedures that had been implemented. SA were on site from 15.00-00.00 hours and were able to observe all elements of ingress, briefings (including Showstop, security and control room), showtime, and egress and the implementation of the Traffic Management Plan. SA were permitted to speak to staff from all areas of the business as well as customers who attended the event.

8. Visit to O2 Victoria Warehouse Manchester 11/11/23 – Approximate attendance 3200

8.1. On Saturday 11th November 2023, SA attended the venue for a second time, this coincided with a league fixture at Manchester United FC. SA consultants observed the ingress and egress of the football match with the intention of observing any impact or tensions this may cause with the O2 Victoria Warehouse operation. The general area was busy from midday onwards when the observations started. It was noted that customers for the football do park in any available spaces they can find, although on this day SA would suggest that most people attended by train or tram from local stations and walked to the ground.

8.2. SA consultants observed several apparently affiliated parking services within the vicinity. SA observed one that was located in Pomona Strand. It was apparent that this is unlicensed and cash payments were taken from people in effect to park on the public road (although it is understood that some of this road is in fact private). SA did witness some people question this payment (on this occasion £10) which was generally met with hostility by the parking operatives. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SA did not witness any police presence, local authority enforcement teams or interference in this parking enterprise during their visits. This is not to say that the police and local authority are unaware of these issues or failing to take enforcement action. The signage used was in fact exchanged post the football match to highlight 'Event Parking O2 Victoria Warehouse' – AMG and the Victoria Warehouse do not promote or have affiliation with this operation and this is reiterated on their website.

8.3. Trafford Wharf Road houses the 'O2 Victoria Warehouse – Manchester'. It is a route also used to ingress the football stadium. SA would consider the footfall during the hours of 12.00-15.00 hours (match start) to be moderate to heavy but free flowing. Some people used the E3 car park for their

vehicles as part of a hospitality package. This car park is adjacent to the O2 Victoria Warehouse and is used under a lease agreement with the football club to queue guests. This car park was managed by stewarding staff from Manchester United football club during the pre-match. There was no sign of any stewards in this area post-match and although some congestion, vehicles made their way out of the car park without issue.

8.4. SA consultants noticed a police presence in and around the stadium, but this did not move far beyond the immediate vicinity of the football ground. SA noticed many outlets for selling merchandise. The parking situation within Trafford Wharf Road was busy but not chaotic. There were no road closures in place in Trafford Wharf Rd pre - or post-match. The barrier configuration for the O2 Victoria Warehouse event was in place from 15.00 hours. This did not have any impact on the football fans leaving the area as the queue system is contained within the E3 (cobble area) and not on the highway. SA observed that only a handful of attendees for the O2 Victoria Warehouse arrived before 18.00 hours.

8.5. SA consultants observed the egress from the football match which started at around 17.00 hours. There were no road closures in place noted in Trafford Wharf Road, and in effect up to 75,000 people left the stadium over the course of around 2 hours without supervision. Trafford Wharf Road is a conduit to nearby tram and train services so was of course busy but not chaotic. SA would suggest this is standard at many football grounds across the UK. SA would suggest that the vast majority of people leaving the football were cleared from the area by 18.00 hours. The crowds were of a good nature with no incidents of ASB or crime witnessed. The exiting football fans did of course impact on traffic flow due to the numbers, vehicles in SA opinion were being impeded by the sheer number of pedestrians. Although it was noticed that the majority of the vehicles being impacted upon were actual fans leaving the area. SA would suggest that as this is a common occurrence locally residents are aware of the impact on match days. There were no incidents of speeding vehicles or dangerous driving witnessed during this point in the day.

8.6. Open source data available on the Internet utilising the search criteria 'Trafford Wharf Road' within the Greater Manchester Police Transportation Unit (GMTU.gov.uk) showed 0 collisions in the last 3 years in this locality. Widening the search to 'Trafford Park' showed 11 collisions in a 3-year period.

8.7. SA consultants then had the opportunity to observe the procedures involved when a match day fixture occurs at the O2 Victoria Warehouse. This will be discussed in detail further in this report. SA were on site from 12.00hrs - 00.00 hours.

9. Premises Licence

9.1. SA have had sight of the current premises licence and the proposed changes. The changes reflect the desire to update the current licence and ensure it is fit for purpose and satisfies the local authority. AMG have agreed several changes to enhance the operation of the venue. SA have looked at the operation in line with these specific changes.

9.2. As it currently stands, capacity numbers for the venue are:

3,500 - for live music events

5,500 - for club nights

660 – Balcony / Mezzanine (included within the above capacity numbers)

10. Event Management Plan (EMP)

10.1. SA have had sight of the Event Management Plan (EMP) which is very comprehensive. The EMP is a critical document that supports each individual event run at the venue.

10.2. SA feel that the effective completion of the EMP and attached Risk Assessment is the most important process in relation to running safe events at the venue (that need completing prior to all events run at the venue). It is a comprehensive document that includes key safety and security sections that requires assessing and completing and gives responsibility for the safe running of events to named individuals carrying out specific roles and responsibilities. These people include AMG Divisional Manager (off-site – Sian Hayward), Venue Manager (Russell Taylor-Toal), Deputy General Manager (Manos Chatzakis) and Compact Head of Security (Phil Noe). Each section where a named person is identified provides a summary of their roles and responsibilities in the management structure.

10.3. There are sections that include basic information about pre-event protocols, stage activity, communication details and post event activity. There is a specific section on crowd management. The crowd management section appears to place responsibility for crowd management on the security provider in liaison with the venue duty manager. There are also sections entitled; Crime Prevention, Counter Terrorism, Alcohol, Acceptable Behaviour, 'Show Stop' procedure, Illegal Drugs, Artists and Performers, Local Residents, Licensing and a template risk assessment.

10.4. Event Audience Profile. This section makes it explicit around what to expect from individual event audiences from open-source intelligence and previous event experience. This was felt to be critical in correctly identifying risk.

10.5. Ingress procedures for Manchester United Football Club home match day clash – The impact of these fixture clashes is that the use of E3 car park for queueing is limited and the venue adopts a Disney style queueing system incorporating pedestrian barriers along the cobbled area adjacent to the venue. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This extra focus is clearly required for the numbers of people visiting the venue and the football match nearby.

10.6 Medical Provisions – Northwest Events Medical Solutions (NWEMS) are contracted by the venue to provide medically trained professionals to support events. The EMP provides minimum staffing levels and equipment for NWEMS staff at events. There is a dedicated medical room at the coal yard available for the duration of events. Equipment is provided that includes first aid consumables, as well as access to Ambulance (on club nights only), AED, Oxygen and Lifepak Defibrillator.

10.7. SA feel that the medical provisions form is a useable and essential template that allows for detailed and considered measures to put in place for each event based on the risk assessment. As long as a fully accountable and documented risk assessment is undertaken, this is a useful policy and ensures transparent, visible, and auditable processes to support event management.

10.8. *Considerations for AMG (EMP):*

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

General – SA are aware that the revised EMP has the event specific risk assessment as part of the document and keeps the entire EMP and risk assessment together that coordinates activity for each specific event. SA are of the opinion that this is a positive enhancement and ensures each RA is event specific and bespoke.

10.09. Appendix A - Event Specific Risk Assessment (ESRA). This is a generic risk assessment document to be completed for each separate event held at the O2 Victoria Warehouse (alongside

the existing AMG venue risk assessment). The example provided by AMG is for 'Rock/Indie sell out' event. The ESRA matrix adopts the 5 x 5 risk scale and, if completed accurately, identifies apparent, identifiable, and possible risks, and allows for mitigation and control measures to be put in place. Although comprehensive, we feel there should be an event specific section on the ESRA that deals with any issues highlighted in relation to a specific band, act or performer(s). We also feel this should form part of the EMP to ensure that the EMP and ESRA process is joined up and coordinated. SA feel this would improve on the existing EMP and ESRA process.

11. Showstop Briefing

11.1 SA were given access to the pre-show 'Showstop' briefing at 17.00 hours. This was led by the production manager Mr Russell Pate. SA are of the opinion that this meeting was nothing short of exceptional. The control and communication was robust and engaging. It was comprehensive and very detailed in providing key information. This is a vital element to the safe running of an event. The ShowStop Procedure and policy is within the provided EMP documentation. This meeting was well attended by management and the artists tour team. SA suggests that a 'live' testing of this procedure is carried out within the next 6 months.

12. Queue Management O2 Victoria Warehouse.

12.1. SA conducted a full review of the proposed queueing system to facilitate entry to the O2 Victoria Warehouse, Manchester, operated by Academy Music Group (AMG).

12.2. The security operation at the O2 Victoria Warehouse Manchester is managed by Compact Security Services Ltd (CSS). They have vast experience in event management including at this venue and have experience in securing major public events as well as many licensed premises. CSS have Approved Contractor Status. At the time of this report their website was under construction.

12.3. This review has been completed with reference to the EMP, other provided documents and the relevant meetings with the venue management and security provider, CSS.

12.4. As previously stated, SA consultants attended the initial site meeting on the 10th November 2023. The proposed queue management system was verbally explained by both AMG management and security staff. SA have had sight of both the ingress and egress plans for cross-reference.

12.5. Fundamentally, SA have been asked to consider if this presented plan for queue management will be both safe and effective. It is the opinion of SA that for a determination to be made, three main elements need to be satisfied.

- The plan maximises the safety of the customers.
- The plan minimises the risk of critical incidents at the venue.
- The plan minimises impact on the local community.

12.6 It is worthy of note that no security operation will be completely infallible, but through robust management and constant review, training and testing of processes, the likelihood of critical failure is minimised.

12.7. The analysis undertaken by SA will look at the final system presented and make any recommendations as appropriate. It is understood that the presented plans are to cater for a show which is at or near venue capacity. Compact Security explained that they always had a minimum number of staff deployed to any event and would not fall below this number. They utilise predominantly SIA trained security officers and a minimal number of stewards. This combination is important to note, as it is a more costly option, but it ensures trained security personnel are the primary option for securing the site. SA were informed that actual deployed numbers may change due to the risk assessment process which was specific to each event. This is wholly appropriate and necessary. Compact Security have a robust system for increasing staff capacity which can be implemented with almost immediacy if required. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This ratio of SIA to customers is over and above what SA would usually experience in venues of this size. [REDACTED]

12.8. For the purposes of consistency, SA will refer to specific points in line with the maps presented within the ingress and egress plans.

12.9. Venue Arrival Points (Non-Manchester United FC Match Day)

12.10. The venue operates a system of customers queueing in the E3 car park. Most customers appeared to arrive by public transport, taxis or on foot. SA consultants observed very limited vehicular traffic within Trafford Wharf Road during the majority of the deployments.

12.11. For the benefit of assessment, SA will highlight the customer journey chronologically as it has been presented in both the briefing and the associated plans.

12.12. As the customers move towards the entry point which is the main metal gates to the E3 car park they are greeted by SIA staff who conduct a soft ticket check, should they not have the correct tickets they can easily be directed away from the premises to prevent any blockage or delay for the other customers. SA witnessed SIA staff removing alcoholic drinks from people as they entered the queue system and all drinking vessels at the hard check point. This is the main and only monitored access point. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The SIA staff were both welcoming and had positive and clear communication skills, all clearly identifiable.

12.13. There is both barrier and security provision to the front of the building and a large number of cones strategically placed along the road directly outside the curtilage of the venue on Trafford Wharf Road, to act as a warning for motorists and to encourage people to use the footway and not the road.

12.14. The E3 car park provides sufficient distance from the road and is enclosed with robust metal security fencing as well as the temporary internal double barrier systems. Sufficient lighting was in place, and it is the understanding of SA that this will be enhanced.

12.15. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SA recommend that visual signage is improved at the main entrance to direct customers correctly. This may also assist with accessibility issues of customers. This will also avoid confusion when conflicting events are staged in the locality. SA would suggest that the dot-based plans are reviewed and updated accordingly and presented in an architect style street view.

12.16. The O2 Victoria Warehouse Manchester employ litter pickers in the vicinity of the venue. They are identifiable with high-visibility tabards only. SA would suggest they are marked with O2 Victoria Warehouse branding. This system is a positive feature of this plan, it bolsters the visual appearance of the security operation by adding in effect extra 'capable guardians' who can interact with the customers and provide vital information if required.

12.17. A box office is located to the front of the premises in a small porta-cabin on Trafford Wharf Road. This has a small barrier area to the front to keep it separate from the pavement area. SA would suggest some additional signage is made available when in operation. This is also used for people

attending with accessibility issues. SA would estimate there were no more than 5 persons at this booth at any one time. This area has an SIA operative posted here for the duration of opening in case of any conflict.

12.18. Once customers have passed the soft ticket check, (cursory check at this location to ensure customers have a ticket for the relevant show) they are guided into the first queue system of red barriers, this runs adjacent to the perimeter mental fence on Trafford Wharf Road and is set up in zig-zag style. This then leads into a secondary 'Disney' style configuration that's located within the E3 carpark. This system allows an almost constant flow and stops overcrowding.

12.19. *The venue uses a product called 'Safe Tix', which provides customers with a unique barcode that automatically refreshes every 15 seconds instead of a static one. This greatly reduces the risk of ticket fraud from stolen or illegal counterfeit tickets. In addition, this system will prevent additional customers gaining entry to the queue system minimising risk of overcrowding. This will be included in the pre-event information.*

12.20. SIA staff monitor and manage this queue system robustly but positively. SA feel that this is a positive use of staff, offering even more ability to identify any potential issues early and prior to the customer getting inside the hard ticket check point and security search area.

12.21. Compact Security have a rapid response unit available to be deployed as appropriate (this will be in addition to the proposed fixed-point SIA locations). The numbers in this team are at least 3 SIA staff.

12.22. Hard Ticket Checkpoint

12.23. The main queue within the E3 carpark comprises of attached 'Ped' barriers, they are further secured together with cable ties. These are all checked by members of staff before entry is permitted. Once the customer reaches the front of the queue, 6 search lanes are visible with tables. At this stage the hard ticket scan will be carried out by venue staff, supported by the SIA team members. The separation of these roles SA would consider as vital.

12.24. The venue prohibits bags beyond A4 size being admitted to the venue. A cloakroom is available for coats and bags which is free of charge for O2 customers. All bags are searched prior to entry. Although a search condition is not present on the licence, SA would consider the search

regime robust. Oversized bags can be deposited at the Premier Inn (opposite O2 Victoria Warehouse) where an agreement has been made between the hotel and O2 Victoria Warehouse.

[REDACTED]

12.26. There are policies in place to support staff with the search protocol, but ongoing training is vital to ensuring the policies are adhered to. The training programmes outlined by CSS appear sufficient. All new staff have inductions and training and are overseen by managers.

12.27. As the configuration stands, SA are of the opinion this is the best possible solution for safe and effective movement of people into the venue. SA witnessed the whole queue from approximately 19.00 hours onwards (door opening time). It was noted that if it became overcrowded a decision could be made to allow customers into the venue early. This was not appropriate on either night. SA would suggest that the customer base was mixed and diverse, good natured and engaging. In SA's opinion, the average wait time for entry into the venue was in SA opinion minimal. It was apparent that the majority of the customers arrived between 20.00 – 21.00 hours. Upon speaking to a number of customers the overriding feeling was of positive safety and a good customer experience.

12.28. It was noted that lots of customers actually attended on both nights for this particular show. It was also noted within both briefings and visually that a considerable number of the audience was made up of people from the LGBTQ+ community. SA noticed that the atmosphere was very positive and had an overwhelming feeling of inclusivity.

12.29. Entry on this configuration is directly into SHED C entrance. From this point customers can easily move to the bars, merchandise, or cloakroom areas. SA suggested the lighting could be improved in this area, which was in fact done on the second visit the following day. SA would also suggest that the signage inside the premises is reviewed, since it was not easy to read and could be difficult for people with sight impairment to understand or to locate exits easily. That being said SA found the venue fairly easy to navigate.

12.30. Medics are positioned at the hard ticket and search checkpoint. This allowed them to be on hand to check medication. SA noticed this happen on numerous occasions.

12.31. The system for audience arrival is comprehensive and robust. Due to the geography of the venue, queueing options are relatively limited but as stated this is the safest and most efficient way. Any potential issues identified can easily be dealt with and customers removed from the queue, this has the added benefit of being away from the rest of the queue. It would then be easy for security staff to usher people refused entry away once outside the main gates of carpark E3. In this configuration customers do not at any point queue on the pavements on Trafford Wharf Road which significantly reduces the risk of vehicle collisions with pedestrians.

12.32. The plan being presented is well considered and viable but will need to be subjected to ongoing review and testing.

12.33. Effective queueing procedures for larger events are essential to ensure a smooth operation and ensure and maintain the safety and satisfaction of customers. In summary the venue has proposed what SA consider to be the fundamental elements to satisfy the three main objectives.

13. Queue Management – Match Day Clash (11/11/23)

13.1. In the opinion of SA, the local authority was correct to have initial concerns over customers queueing along the pavement on Trafford Wharf Road on their visits, this could cause concern especially as vehicles can move freely in this area. The risk of injury either intentionally or unintentionally by moving vehicles is increased, SA understands that at time this was the only option available to adequately deal with the expected numbers during a match day clash. To mitigate this risk a Traffic Management Plan (TMP) was approved and implemented in late 2021 and is currently still in place.

13.2. After negotiation with Manchester United Football Club, the venue has now been permitted to utilise a section of the E3 car park directly adjacent to the building. This in effect allows them to create a sterile area and employ a 'zigzag' barrier system on the 'cobbled' area inside the car park. SA consultants witnessed this method in operation. This completely removes the need to queue on the footpath outside the venue.

13.3. The entry point to the queue is directly next to the E3 gates and the customers are funnelled into the barrier queue system, which fills from the rear of the car park.

13.4. Once the customers have navigated the zig-zag barrier system, the queue then moves into two channels which run alongside the main building (approximately 80 metres) towards a short flight of stairs. There is a channel kept empty which runs immediately along the building line. There is a break point in the centre of these channels to allow access for people with disability including wheel chair access. SA would suggest some rubber ramps may enhance this experience.

13.5. SA consultants observed this in operation, and it adequately dealt with the numbers arriving. Even in the peak demand time between 20.00 – 21.00 hours the queue moved at a decent flow rate without incident. It was anticipated that on both nights approximately 3200 customers were due to attend. [REDACTED]

13.6. The search system is then placed to the rear of the premises in a secure walled area and remains with 6 channels along with tables. The search system is identical to non-match day events albeit in a different location. Customers once beyond the search area enter into the main building.

13.7. The curtilage of the building does have vehicle protection by way of metal loop street furniture. This is supplemented with a HARAS barrier system to offer further protection for the customers. SA identified a natural break in the steel loops and suggested with the venue management some options for enhanced security if it was felt appropriate.

[REDACTED]

13.8. In the statement presented by Nicola Duckworth, concerns were properly raised around the possibility of hostile vehicle attacks, but this was more likely when the queue system was on the public footpath. There is always a risk of potential threat in crowded spaces, but the mitigation SA consultants saw on the event nights would minimise this risk significantly. The options outlined above will only minimise this risk even further.

14. Egress and Dispersal

14.1. SA consultants witnessed the egress and dispersal of customers on both event nights without incident. A Traffic Management Plan was in operation on both events, but confined to the egress only. TMPs must be agreed and signed off by the Local Authority.

14.2. SIA officers were positioned along Trafford Wharf Road in accordance with the egress plan that was presented to SA. The staff were all engaged in speaking to the customers, offering advice and directing them away from the premises.

14.3. There were limited vehicle movements noticed and at no stage was it felt that there was any danger to those leaving the O2 Victoria Warehouse. SA consultants noticed 1 unlicensed merchandise seller in the vicinity on both nights.

14.4. SA would estimate that within approximately 20 minutes most customers had left the immediate vicinity either by foot, taxi, public transport, or their own vehicles. It was noted that a number made their way to the unofficial parking areas highlighted earlier, crossing the Trafford Road.

14.5. Pre-booked and touting taxi vehicles were prevalent in the area. SA consultants were touted at least 5 times on each night. Although serving a purpose this is in fact illegal. SIA staff have no jurisdiction or powers available to them to manage illegal taxi touting.

14.6. The majority of the waiting taxi cabs were on Trafford Road junction with Trafford Wharf Road. As defined within the TMP this road is closed during egress. Although this did impact on traffic flow, it was not considered dangerous as Trafford Road has multiple lanes.

14.7. Vehicular Traffic in Trafford Wharf Road was limited but this was in the main due to the TMP and the associated temporary road closures. This TMP has the benefit of keeping the area between the venue and Trafford Road sterile. All vehicles were prohibited from entering this area apart from residents and those collecting people with a disability. This had obvious benefits for the customers leaving the venue and moving away safely. The TMP was consistently managed on both nights while observed by SA consultants.

14.8. When leaving the O2 Victoria Warehouse there are 3 main routes for exit which are clearly identifiable and facilitated by the SIA staff. Customers are encouraged to utilise the pavement and to walk through the pedestrian zone directly opposite the exit of the venue. Signage and a barrier

funnel may assist with this if it is adopted as the preferred egress route. SA consultants noticed that most customers headed towards Trafford Road, from the venue via Trafford Wharf Road.

14.9. No instances of ASB or criminality were witnessed by SA on either deployment. SA asked the venue management and security managers if they had knowledge of any vehicle collisions or near misses reported to them. SA were told there was no instances recorded. Open source data shows there 0 collisions recorded in Trafford Wharf Road over the last 3 years, and only a handful of collisions in the wider vicinity. It does not go into detail on type of collision or severity (i.e., vehicle versus vehicle or vehicle versus pedestrian). This data will be available under a FOIA request should it be necessary or required.

15. Traffic Management Plan

15.1. The TMP is comprehensive and clear on what is expected. The primary objectives of any TMP are as follows.

- Maintain public safety on the local highway infrastructure.
- To minimise disruption to all road users with special emphasis on maintaining the integrity of those routes which act as a local alternative to the strategic trunk road system.
- Minimise the disruption and impact of such events on local communities.

15.2. SA consultants had the opportunity to witness this plan in operation and consider it in the main to be fit for purpose in order to achieve the set objectives. On both nights it was in place for a maximum of 30 minutes. It was consistent with the presented plan and achieved the desired outcomes.

[REDACTED]

16. Venue Management Conclusion

16.1. The ingress queue management and the egress from the premises contained within the presented (and observed) plan in SA opinion (on both configurations).

- Maximises the safety of the customers.
- Minimises the risk of critical incidents.
- Minimises impact on the local community.

SA believe that AMG have complied with this by the following means:

16.2. Pre-Event Information – AMG and the venue provides clear and detailed information to attendees about the queue process before the event, informs them what they can expect, where the queues will be located, and any requirements they need to meet before entering the queue.

16.3. Signage and Information – This is adequate but to further enhance this, SA would suggest considering either digital or traditional temporary signage at strategic locations along Trafford Wharf Road. This could include requirements customers need to follow to be permitted entry, or purely indicate the entry point to the venue. This can be supplemented by the positive verbal interaction from uniformed staff who provide information and reassurance as necessary.

16.4. Queue Management - With a combination of CSS SIA trained staff and venue AMG staff all working cohesively, with clearly defined roles for a common purpose of customer safety and security, the system witnessed on these deployments by SA consultants is efficient and effective.

Overall, the main points of note are:

- A one-way controlled queue system with zigzag style barriers contained within the E3 secure car park area.
- A robust and clearly defined system with optimal security staff at identified locations including the soft and hard ticket check points.
- Separation of roles (ticket checkers and security staff remain autonomous)
- Limiting vehicular traffic in Trafford Wharf Road with a Traffic Management Plan at key times of ingress or egress (or both)
- Mitigation of hostile vehicle attacks by placement and location of the queue system and physical barriers and the TMP.
- A comprehensive search screening process
- A post event egress plan

16.5. Capacity Management - By continual monitoring of the queue length, and using the proposed barrier system, the flow can be adjusted accordingly (or diverted) to allow faster access into the event area based on volume of customers, this was seen in operation on the 11th November 2023.

16.6. Venue Security. SA tested the arrangements for access into the premises. This being limited to the utilised entry point (determined by a match day or normal day). There were no options for people to breach the security without a valid ticket. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

16.7. Security Screening efficiency - Security checks will be necessary, but technology can increase the speed of the operation as required. Every person entering the venue had a bag search, pockets emptied, and search wands were used for screening. Manual searching would be more time restrictive but should not be ruled out as an option. SA would suggest some bowls for placement of customer items as occasionally coins and personal effects did unintentionally drop on the floor. This can slow up the entry process and cause frustration.

16.8. Continuous monitoring and improvement - The continuous monitoring of the queue process during an event is vital, coupled with an ability to make minor adjustments if required (although this should be sanctioned by a supervisor). Gathering of feedback from customers will enable identification of areas for improvement. This will be enhanced with a de-brief and feedback loop. It has also been noted that this has been enhanced by:

- Ongoing regular intelligence meetings with local police licensing officers. (SA would suggest that the monthly licensing meeting is extended to the local authority).
- Communication with neighbouring sporting facilities to share information, SA would suggest this is formalised monthly.

16.9. Accessibility and Inclusivity - The venue has catered for access issues and outlined a procedure which in our view will ensure all people can participate in events comfortably. The venue has specified access doors within both queue systems and a viewing area on the balcony for customers with specific needs, medical staff are also posted to this area throughout the show.

██
██
██

17. Medical Provision

17.1. The medical provision was not originally within the terms of reference for SA, but it is worthy of note in this report. SA spent time with the paramedic and other staff members it was clear they shared a passion for working at the venue and were proud to be part of the team. In the opinion of SA, the medical staff were positioned in order to provide immediate assistance should it be required. SA visited the medical office which was clean and comfortable. This has been organically joined to the safeguarding provision which will be mentioned later in this report.

17.2. As previously mentioned, medics were on hand at ingress and search to assist in identification of medication.

17.3 SA observed the medics during show time strategically placed in the venue. They had access to both a welfare area and their own office to provide support and assistance if required. They were linked in on the radio system for immediate deployment as necessary.

18. Safeguarding

18.1. O2 Victoria Warehouse have partnered with 'W.E.L.SAFE CIC', a not-for-profit community organisation established in 2017 delivering welfare and harm reduction at live events, clubs and festivals, creating non-judgemental safer spaces for all.

18.2. SA witnessed this in operation over the two nights and spoke at length to the staff. This in our opinion is the gold standard in safeguarding within the events sphere, utilising full time staff and volunteers offering a whole range of services and support. This links perfectly with the medical provision provided at the venue. The staff here were proactive at the ingress, patrolling the inside of the venue and attending to the needs of people at their welfare area.

19. Policies and Procedures

19.1. SA reviewed a number of policies currently in place to support the licensing objectives in relation to the venue. SA have reviewed each individual policy and made comment in relation to its effectiveness, workability, and any compliance/governance issues that they have identified. SA have also made recommendations if/where appropriate that they feel would enhance and/or support the current policy. Shown below are policy reviews that were felt pertinent to this review.

19.2. Effective policies are an important part of the process in running a safe night-time economy venue. It is critical that all staff engaged with the operational running of the venue read and understand their content. As a general recommendation SA would suggest that all O2 Victoria Warehouse policies are refreshed and reviewed to ensure they are current and up to date and should be subject to review annually.

19.3. Compact Security Stewarding Plan – This is a document provided by Compact Security and presents an outline of the security and stewarding operating plan for the O2 Victoria Warehouse. Compact states that they have drawn upon experience of similar venues, events, and historical operational knowledge of this nature to ensure an effective Stewarding operation is delivered. There is a section that covers ‘Event Briefing’ (there are no page numbers on this document). SA feel more detail is required in this section that looks to provide site specific information/risks etc and covers issues such as layout of building, ingress and egress routes, emergency response plans, list of communication channels, details of risks highlighted in the EMP etc. SA feel the process should also include a staff de-brief section so that any concerns or issues experienced can be captured for future events. Otherwise, the document is comprehensive, detailed and provides useful guidance to the stewarding team.

19.4. ‘Show Stop’ Procedure – The ‘Show Stop’ process is explained, and specific roles and responsibilities defined. The Show-stop will be considered in response to an immediate risk to life or safety of patrons, staff, or performers. This may be expanded to include an event happening outside the venue. Otherwise, this is a comprehensive policy.

19.5. The ‘Show Stop’ policy gives details of what is called the ‘Show Stop’ procedure, (a procedure that will halt a live event and remove the performers(s) from the stage). It provides a list of incidents that may lead to the ‘Show Stop’ procedure being undertaken along with who can authorise it and the communication channels in place. All of the events listed are related to the inside of the event venue. It is presumed that any major incident, including outside of the venue (possibly not even

linked to the event) may instigate a 'Show Stop'. Although minor, this could be specifically included in the policy.

19.6. Emergency Lockdown – This policy sets out clear instructions in relation to what to expect from the staff and security team if a 'Lockdown' is instigated at the venue: a generic and clear policy. SA recommends that this is tested with staff annually.

19.7. Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) – This is a bespoke plan for the O2 Victoria Warehouse dealing with responses to emergencies (critical incidents) at the venue. The Plan provides details of the overall responsible people; Russell Taylor-Toal and Emmanouil Chatzakis. Contact details on the second page. It also sets out key responsibilities for the emergency response team and venue staff if there is an emergency incident at the venue. [REDACTED]

19.8. The EOP document sets out minimum expectations for the emergency response team and staff to know the detail in the plan and undertake appropriate training. There are evacuation diagrams and details of assembly points outside the venue. The first few sections detail the response to a fire/fire alarm activation and what the responsible person and the team are required to do. This section is comprehensive and provides clear instructions and responsibilities for staff. The only thing SA would add is to ensure that if a fire is discovered, the exact location should be radioed to all staff to ensure any evacuation route avoids it.

19.9. The following sections are included and provide guidance in the following circumstances:

Section VI deals with earthquakes

Section VII deals with serious injuries reported.

Section VIII details a response to hazardous materials

Section IX deals with the response to a bomb threat

Section X provides a counter terrorism response.

The final section provides guidance in the case or a terrorist or major incident incorporating the METHANE template guidance.

19.10. Overall, the EOP is comprehensive and detailed. There are a number of key personnel detailed in the evacuation section and throughout the document. These are important members of

staff, and it is critical that there is an auditable record of their knowledge, training and relevant professional qualifications in relation to their responsibilities in the plan.

19.11 Ingress Policy / Ingress Match Day Clash - Detailed and comprehensive. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SA have tested this ingress plan as detailed in the report.

19.12. Egress Plan. Detailed and comprehensive, tested during the site visit and described within this report. SA would suggest adding a supervisor's de-brief section.

19.13. Alcohol Management Plan - A comprehensive plan. In section 2.1, Bar Management – this mentions a briefing for staff. SA recommend having a template that sets out what the briefing will include to ensure consistency across the venue. For example; the Victoria Warehouse layout with emergency exits pointed out and Lockdown process explained, specific event risks from EMP/ESRA, Licensing Objectives etc. Consider making the staff briefing section a stand-alone section as effective briefing of staff is critical to the safe running of events. Consider a post-event de-brief process to capture concerns or good practice.

20. Policies Conclusion

20.1. AMG have developed and implemented a number of policies to support events at all of their venues across the UK. SA have found that in general the policies are comprehensive and responsive to the risks inherent with running large scale events.

20.2. SA have reviewed the policies and commented on some of the possible enhancements identified. They provide guidance to managers, security teams and staff at AMG venues on subjects ranging from drugs seizures, ingress and egress plans and crowd safety procedures. The policies are fit for purpose and provide well considered practical measures to deal with issues that can and do occur at licensed event venues.

20.3. In SA view the most important document reviewed is the Event Management Plan (EMP). This is completed for each event and provides more specific information and intelligence. There is currently a stand-alone risk assessment to support the EMP. The EMP provides a management structure and an auditable trail of decision making, giving key roles and responsibilities to named individuals. SA feel that completing this document effectively is critical to running safe and secure events.

20.4. Other policies that the venue might consider enhancing and supporting the existing framework include –

- i) Sexual Offences/Spiking and Vulnerable people policy,
- ii) Age/ID policy,
- iii) Alcohol, Intoxication, Refusals & Ejections Procedure.

SA understand that these policies exist within the AMG general policies, and are implemented at the O2 Victoria Warehouse but were not presented in the provided bundle.

21. Community Engagement and Partnership

21.1. SA have identified lots of good practice already in place, such as mentorship initiatives and acting as a venue for police training exercises, but to further enhance their reputation and standing within the community, consideration could be given to some of the following areas.

21.2. O2 Victoria Warehouse have formalised monthly meetings with the police. This could be an opportunity for the local authority licensing to attend. This will offer an opportunity to share important information/intelligence between the venue and partners on crime, anti-social behaviour, and complaints. This also could be an opportunity to offer collaboration on local based initiatives including sponsorship. They also have points of contact at both Manchester United FC and the Old Trafford Cricket Club in order to share information. SA suggests that this meeting is formalised.

21.3. Cultural events and celebrations where O2 Victoria Warehouse and local cultural organisations combine nightlife entertainment with artistic experiences. These events attract diverse audiences and contribute to the promotions of local arts and culture.

21.4. Environmental Initiatives whereby the venue promotes sustainability initiatives within the venue and the community.

21.5. Youth programmes which would include hosting DJ workshops or educational initiatives to engage local young people. This could also include art and cultural projects where local musical artists are supported.

22. Conclusions

22.1. SA consultants have had the opportunity to visit the O2 Victoria Warehouse on two separate occasions and assess primarily the external operational areas to the venue. They have also had the

opportunity to meet with key members of the management team from AMG along with the security provider Compact Security Services Ltd. During these meetings the management and security team have been open and transparent in providing SA consultants with working documents and ideas on the future operation of the venue.

22.2. SA have been provided with several proposed operational documents that have been highlighted within this report. In the main all the documents are comprehensive and contain sufficient detail in which to operate a venue effectively and safely. During the consultation SA provided additional suggestions to help improve their security arrangements and support their operational processes.

22.3. It is important to recognise that the overarching features of every security plan is to maximise safety and minimise risk. In addressing these points SA feel that AMG and Compact Security have done this. SA have suggested several minor enhancements that will support the policies and add value to the overall Event Management Plan (EMP) during the consultation period.

22.4. SA view the Event Management Plan (EMP) as the most important document which is supported by its own internal bespoke policies. The EMP is completed for each event and provides specific information and intelligence as well as a risk assessment and crowd management plans. The EMP provides a management structure and an auditable trail of decision making, giving key roles and responsibilities to named individuals. SA feel that completing this document effectively and including an event specific risk assessment as part of the planning is critical to running safe and secure events.

22.5. In addressing the EMP the company has invested in correct training and ensured that they have accredited skills in risk management and SA consider this to be a significant factor when completing this document.

22.6. AMG have developed and implemented several policies to support events at all of their venues across the UK. SA have found that in general the policies are comprehensive and responsive to the risks inherent with running large scale events.

22.7. SA have reviewed the policies and made comments where appropriate. They provide guidance to managers, security teams and staff at AMG venues on subjects ranging from drugs seizures, and crowd safety procedures. The policies are fit for purpose and provide well considered practical measures to deal with issues that can and do occur at licensed event venues.

22.8. SA would also suggest that an independent security company / consultancy carries out periodic compliance visits to the venue that would be either planned or unannounced. This would provide AMG, Police, local authority, and the local community with reassurance that they are operating safely and meeting the licensing objectives.

22.9. SA have considered the concerns made by Nicola Duckworth. SA summarise the concerns and SA's conclusions as follows:

1. Para.2 - In 2019 ND was concerned regarding the speeding vehicles in Trafford Wharf Road with a risk of persons being struck by fast moving vehicles, either intentionally or by accident.
SA could not see any evidence of fast-moving vehicles in this road. The provision of a TMP prohibits such movement and safeguards the public. SA would expect that if this was seen as a problem area for speeding vehicles that the police would have held speed enforcement operations. Open source research shows 0 traffic collisions in 3 years. AMG have developed a queuing system so that it is contained within the curtilage of the O2 Victoria Warehouse, which SA consider is a safe and secure system.
2. Para.3 - Crowd management at the O2 Victoria Warehouse
SA have spent considerable time analysing the queue systems on both match day and non-match days. It is SA's opinion that AMG/O2 Victoria Warehouse have maximised safety and minimised risk with their ingress and egress configuration.
3. Para.3 - Risks associated with holding events at the same time as other local large events (Manchester United Football Club)
SA can see no issues associated with a match day clash; most football events are completed prior to shows at O2 Victoria Warehouse starting. The improvement to the ingress queue system minimises risk even further. The two events are distinct and separate.
4. Para.6 Proper systems for Ingress and Egress.
SA have outlined the ingress and egress plans and are satisfied that they are both practical and proportionate, promoting safety and security of customers in order to hold events.
5. Para.6 - CCTV Issues
The venue has a comprehensive CCTV system in place.
6. Para.6 - Lighting Issues

Lighting on ingress has been updated and further lighting is proposed within the E3 car park area, which will enhance the high-powered flood lighting already in place. The perimeter of the building is well lit.

7. Para.6 - Medical Provision

The Medical provision is competent and robust, and further enhanced with the provision of a wellbeing / safeguarding service, which is considered excellent.

8. Para.10 – Concern regarding crime and disorder associated with football fans leaving Manchester United FC.

The O2 Victoria Warehouse has had regular meetings with the police; there is no significant crime attributed to the venue. There are minuted meeting notes available, which were seen by SA consultants. The behaviour of another venue should not have any impact on the O2 Victoria Warehouse. Any criminality or ASB arising from football fans cannot be the responsibility of the O2 Victoria Warehouse, nor should it be attributed to them for licensing hearing purposes.

9. Para. 17 – Concern regarding access control to the mezzanine balcony.

An access control policy is in place. SA consultants witnessed the clicker system in operation. This worked well during both nights without incident, and is per the policy.

10. Para. 20 – Concern over stewarding plan being generic.

SA feel that the Security / Stewarding Plan is robust and fit for purpose. This was confirmed when seen in live operation. Dot plans will require a minor refresh with a briefing deployment plan.

11. Para. 35 – Opinion that the venue has failed to operate the premises in a manner consistent with promoting the licensing objectives. ND outlines the rationale for this opinion.

SA consider that, based on their inspection, this venue is being managed to a high standard, in accordance with the licensing objectives and the introduction of the Event Management Plan and Risk Assessment process, together with the suggestions made in this report, will ensure that this continues to be the case.

21.10. Licensing Objectives

- The security and safety of those visiting a venue.

AMG and Compact Security Services have a robust and cohesive security operation. SA have looked at this end-end over the course of 2 event nights. SA consultants witnessed no issues that caused any concern. The ingress is efficient and professional and the egress (coupled with the TMP) is efficient and effective.

AMG utilise an Event Specific Risk Assessment, this will run in tandem with the EMP.

- The prevention of crime and disorder

The provision of a professional security operation (SIA personnel), stewards, litter pickers and traffic management staff act as ‘capable guardians’ for the community. There was no evidence of ASB (unless directly reported to the Local Authority) and no crime pattern is attributable to the venue. Customers felt safe and secure with good medical provision, water stations, outreach safeguarding, cloakroom provision, phone charge points and ample security staff.

Criminal activity was noticed in the vicinity of the venue as mentioned: car parking, merchandise sellers, taxi touting. This is not the responsibility of the venue to police and SA would not recommend any interference in these operations but to report it to the authorities for action.

- The prevention of public nuisance

AMG have not received nuisance or noise complaints from residents. SA witnessed the egress as stated and this was both fast, efficient and without incident. SA were impressed with how seamlessly this worked minimising impact on residents.

Issues relating to crowded spaces have been addressed with both the ingress and egress plans. SA have suggested some minor considerations to improve this further. Although the Protect Duty is on the horizon, as it may still be subject to change and is not legislation, SA would advise AMG to wait until the exact requirements are announced.

- The protection of young and vulnerable people from harm

AMG have a robust response to safeguarding. ‘W.E.L.SAFE CIC’ is in the opinion of SA the gold standard in safeguarding provision, with a safe space as well as outreach workers. It is utilised alongside highly trained SIA staff and Medics on each event.

22.11. SA have had an opportunity to review the operation and make suggestions as appropriate. The management team at O2 Victoria Warehouse were professional, committed, and proud of their venue. This is a first-class operation, supported by a forward thinking and proactive security provision. It is the opinion of SA that O2 Victoria Warehouse have fully upheld the licensing objectives and the conditions set on their licence.



22.12. In the professional opinion of SA both AMG, O2 Victoria Warehouse and Compact Security Services have a robust and comprehensive approach to safety for events held at the O2 Victoria Warehouse. It is the professional opinion of SA, with collectively over 90 years policing experience that, to the best of their ability, they have maximised their security protocols and in turn the safety of customers whilst minimising the risk of critical incidents both inside and outside the venue.

Gary Taylor MIoL, NEBOSH
Director Shield Associates
27/11/2023

Ian Smith MSyl
Director Shield Associates
27/11/2023

Dave Gair IPSA IoL
Director Shield Associates
27/11/2023

General Recommendations

SA recommendations will support and enhance the existing plans and procedures adopted by AMG and CSS Ltd.

Section	Recommendation	Agreed by AMG
11	AMG / Compact Security should consider a training exercise to test the show stop procedure and full evacuation and ensure this documented, ideally within the next 6 months and then annually.	
12.12	██ ██	
12.15	Increase visual signage at the main venue entrance point and at the box office area.	
12.15	██ ██	
12.29	Review signage inside the venue for purposes of accessibility.	
14.3.	██ ██ ██	
15.7	Consider using bowls or trays for customers personal items at search point.	
20.	Formalise local network meeting with Trafford CC and Manchester United FC.	
21.	Consider annual external independent audit / inspection to test processes at venue.	